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I. INTRODUCTION 
Displeasure with constitutional law has been a fixture in 
American constitutional scholarship probably for as long as 
constitutional law has been around. Yet in the main, scholars 
have worked within the confines of the enterprise itself, trying to 
show how particular judicial decisions were unwise, rested on 
faulty logic, or were unsupported given the writer’s preferred 
mode of interpretive methodology. Mainstream constitutional 
theory also accepted the premises of constitutionalism. 
Foundational works did not question the desirability of having a 
constitution or dispute the courts’ power of judicial review of 
legislation, but rather sought to justify it. Different as they are, 
Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch,3 Ely’s Democracy and 
Distrust,4 Tribe’s American Constitutional Law,5 or Ackerman’s 
We the People,6 broadly stand for the idea that although 
constitutionalism and judicial review may seem problematic 
from a democratic standpoint, they can nevertheless be 
vindicated in one way or another. And moreover, that the 
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American constitutional project, as it has developed over the 
years, is one worth preserving. 
In recent decades, however, this approach has begun to 
unravel. Armed with the political insights of American legal 
realism and critical legal studies, the internal critique of Supreme 
Court decisions, while still the bread and butter of constitutional 
scholarship, has been supplemented by new avenues of 
constitutional theorizing. The problem for the new wave of 
constitutional scholarship did not (or not always) lie with faulty 
judicial reasoning, internal contradictions, or morally trouble-
some court decisions, but with a deep skepticism about the 
constitutional project as a whole. Weary of deploying the usual 
moves against decisions they believed to be mistaken, scholars 
went after the institutions that produced them, namely, the 
Supreme Court. The calls to end or reform judicial review grew 
out of an exasperation over the way constitutional law was 
made, the institutions in charge of its development, and what 
scholars believed was the harmful effect of judicial review on the 
political branches and on the political culture.7 
The most important intellectual movement to emerge from 
this, Popular Constitutionalism, spearheaded the call to “Take the 
Constitution away from the Courts,” or to significantly cut back on 
the power of judicial review. Popular and progressive 
constitutionalists, under various stripes, sought to shift the task of 
constitutional interpretation from the Supreme Court to Congress, 
to the Executive, to states, to lower courts, to social movements, 
and to the people at large.8 Instead of focusing exclusively on the 
first order level of desirable or undesirable decisions, popular 
constitutionalists turned to interrogate the second order level of the 
political institutions that generate those decisions. 
Despite their break with earlier constitutional theorists, 
popular constitutionalists still claimed adherence to the 
Constitution, as they sought to reclaim it from courts and return 
it to the “people.” The problem, they maintained, was that 
courts have monopolized constitutional interpretation. This 
 7. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 8. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: 
Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971 (2010); Robert 
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular 
Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010).  
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“judicial overhang” leads legislators to abdicate their 
constitutional responsibility; having non-elected judges decide 
constitutional issues, when those involve subjects of deep 
societal conflict, strips the people of their capacity for self-
government. Of course, some of these arguments were not new, 
but they did crystallize into a more coherent movement that 
deployed a shared rhetoric and reasoning. 
Popular constitutionalists were not alone. Others, such as 
Sanford Levinson and Larry Sabato, called to take stock not just 
of judicial review, but of the constitutional design itself. Shifting 
the focus from the provisions that spark continued legal and 
popular interest to the “hardwired” institutional arrangements 
that structure politics, they argued that the Constitution has 
democratic deficits, produced unfair results, and generated 
political gridlock and a dysfunctional Congress. They urged, 
separately, to revise the Constitution in numerous ways, so as to 
make it more democratic and responsive to popular will. 9 
In their own way, however, both popular constitutionalists 
and constitutional revisionists belong to the camp of 
constitutional fidelity. Neither questions the need for a 
constitution. They remain constitutionalists, although they would 
like to see the Constitution or the practice that attends it 
transformed. In this sense, the new wave of constitutional theory 
is still very much connected to the scholarship that preceded it, 
for neither challenges the basic idea of constitutionalism. 
On the heels of this debate comes Louis Michael Seidman’s 
important and provocative new book, On Constitutional 
Disobedience. Unlike other constitutional theorists, Seidman is not 
concerned with how best to interpret the Constitution or the role of 
the judge. He does not want to revise the Constitution. Instead, he 
wants us to ignore it. His two overarching arguments are, first, that 
if an all things considered judgment counsels us to prefer a 
particular policy, the fact that the Constitution tells us otherwise 
should not matter. Second, that by invoking the Constitution we 
use language that gets in the way of all things considered decisions. 
Thus not only do we not have a political obligation to obey the 
Constitution, but constitutional discourse harms our political 
conversations by excluding merit-based considerations. 
 9. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006); 
LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: WHY THE CONSTITUTION MUST 
BE REVISED: IDEAS TO INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION (2008).  
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In the pages that follow I will present and evaluate 
Seidman’s arguments in favor of constitutional disobedience. 
While I believe that his core argument about the absence of a 
political obligation is sound, I will offer a skeptical rejoinder to 
his vision of political life without a constitution. My main 
argument is that any political program that wants to do away 
with constitutionalism must engage in careful comparative 
institutional analysis. In the end, Seidman may be right, but for 
his claim to succeed more needs to be said about what 
constitutions do and how countries that do not operate under 
written constitutions operate. 
II. THE CORE OF THE ARGUMENT 
The puzzle of constitutional obligation, as Seidman puts it, 
is as follows: If we decide on a course of action, why should the 
fact that a contrary action is required by an old document have 
any power over us? If the right way goes against the 
Constitution, should we not choose what is right over what is 
written? Seidman’s worry is not only that we are making bad 
decisions because of constitutional obedience, but that when 
arguments are phrased in constitutional language they 
unnecessarily raise the stakes of the argument by excluding 
other arguments that are not traceable to the Constitution. This, 
Seidman claims, has “poisoned” political discourse. 
Seidman’s solution is not to take sides in the prevailing 
constitutional debates, which he believes are impossible to 
resolve, but to cut the Gordian knot altogether. Only by putting 
the Constitution aside, by considering it abstractly, as “a work of 
art, designed to evoke a mood or emotion, rather than as a legal 
document commanding specific outcomes,” he argues, can we 
talk about the merits of policy choices without being 
encumbered by the Constitution (p. 8). 
Of course, in order for us to get to that place, we need to 
disarm ourselves of the mistaken notion that we are bound by 
the Constitution. Before we get to that, however, Seidman draws 
our attention to an overlooked feature of modern debates in 
constitutional theory. Those revolve around two issues. The first 
is who should interpret the Constitution. This challenge can be 
traced to Bickel’s countermajoritarian difficulty,10 and even 
before that, to Thayer’s insistence that courts should refrain 
 10. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 15–16.  
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from invalidating laws unless in cases of clear mistakes by 
Congress.11 The second issue, one which follows from the first, is 
how the authoritative interpreter should interpret the 
Constitution. These debates, however, bypass the real question: 
Why is constitutional obedience warranted in the first place (p. 
32)? Everyone assumes that the Constitution is binding and the 
only question is who should interpret it and how. But the 
problem goes much deeper. Constitutionalism itself is 
countermajoritarian. Judicial review is merely a technique for 
assuring constitutional obedience, but legislators can act out of 
constitutional obedience and flout the will of their constituents 
just like judges can ignore majoritarian processes (p. 36). The 
problem, then, is with constitutionalism and not the particular 
devices put in place to carry out its commands.12 
To substantiate his claim for the absence of an obligation of 
constitutional obedience, Seidman examines the prevailing 
justifications grounding such an obligation. These can be divided 
into three types: arguments from precommitment, time-based 
arguments, and arguments from stability. The first two are 
theoretical, the third is empirical. While most of the book is 
devoted to debunking these justifications, for reasons of space I 
will discuss them relatively briefly. 
A. REJECTING PRECOMMITMENT 
Precommitment strategists argue that constitutions are 
desirable because they protect democratic processes from future 
potential violations due to misjudgments or human excesses. As 
Cass Sunstein argues, precommitment devices are not in tension 
with democracy, but rather compatible with democratic self-
government.13 For example, free speech and voting rights 
guarantee that minorities will be heard in the face of hostile 
majorities. Similarly, constitutionally entrenching a separation of 
powers scheme reduces the likelihood of future power grabs, 
while limiting political power.14 A constitution removes 
controversial issues that are likely to get in the way of reasoned 
decisionmaking because of their potential to create factionalism, 
 11. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. Rev. 129 (1893). 
 12. For a description of these devices see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997). 
 13. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 637 (1991). 
 14. Id. at 638.  
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instability, collective action problems, or strategic behavior.15 
Precommitment mechanisms, then, although they constrain 
political choices, purport to strengthen democracy by taking 
certain options off the table and free up resources that can be 
channeled into democratic decisionmaking.16 Now, if 
constitutionally entrenched precommitment strategies facilitate 
a functioning government that guarantees individual rights, we 
may be obligated to obey such a constitution. 
This view of precommitment, however, may rest on a faulty 
analogy. While one can view it as a means to facilitate 
democratic decisionmaking, Seidman argues it is no more than 
an intergenerational power grab (p. 40). Obeying a constitution 
in virtue of it being a constitution means allowing the considered 
judgments at time one to immunize the constitution against the 
considered judgment of future generations (p. 52). Consider the 
classic metaphor to justify precommitment, that of Ulysses tying 
himself to the mast so he can later enjoy the singing of the Sirens 
without being drawn to the coast where they would kill him. The 
problem is that it was Ulysses who decided to precommit 
himself. His decision was made by him and for him. But the 
precommitment argument for constitutionalism is different 
because those who precommit are not the ones who are later 
constrained. These are people from the past who assert power 
on people living today. Perhaps there is a way in which we can 
tell ourselves a story that the Framers are actually us; that there 
is a single, collective, national identity over time that links us and 
them in ways that make their decisions our own. But, as will be 
explained below, such a story is simply that, a story (p. 42). 
To be sure, it is possible that those erstwhile decisions 
enhance our freedom. But Seidman finds this argument lacking. 
Precommitment works only if the right kinds of decisions have 
been made. Not every precommitment mechanism necessarily 
enhances freedom, and by entrenching a particular mechanism 
we make it more difficult to change if we come to the conclusion 
that our freedom is unduly constrained. More importantly, we 
have no a priori reason to believe that the precommitment 
decision in time one was indeed the correct one. It may very well 
be that our decision then was an “all things considered” 
judgment, but it was a different generation’s all considered 
 15. Id. at 642. 
 16. For a classic statement of precommitment as enhancing freedom, see JON 
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (1984).   
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judgment, and it is not clear why past preferences are more 
respect worthy than present preferences, especially when those 
were “revealed” by people who had no idea what modern life 
would look like (p. 49). It is true that we tend to idealize the 
Founding generation, but it is a mistake to believe that they were 
not susceptible to biases and prejudices that are similar to, if not 
more severe than, our own.17 
Of course, we may happen to agree with the decisions 
made by the Framers, but in that case our deference to the 
past is not the result of obligation, but because we are 
persuaded by the content of their decisions (p. 48). 
Remember that the test for a duty of constitutional obedience 
is that we would comply even if our “all things considered” 
judgment would have us go the other way. In cases of 
substantive policy agreement we are not motivated by our 
duty of constitutional obedience, but by our substantive 
agreement with their decisions. Thus we would be free to 
follow the constitutional arrangements we agree with, but we 
would also have the power to modify those that are no longer 
working for us. 
Supporters of the precommitment rationale claim that 
taking certain options off the table stabilizes society and helps 
avert disaster. For example, by protecting questions of 
religion from resolution by democratic processes, we cabin an 
explosive issue that would continually be divisive.18 But as 
Seidman correctly points out, whether disaster will occur is an 
empirical question. People who act out of self-interest often 
(though not always) converge on compromises all sides can 
live with. A constitution may reflect those compromises, but 
the compromises are antecedent to a constitution in that those 
compromises could have been reached regardless. The choice 
between constitutionalism and disaster is therefore a false one 
(p. 46). To wit, countries that do not have a written 
constitution that constitutes a higher law, for example Britain 
or New Zealand, do not explode because they lack disaster 
 17. In addition to the familiar gender and race based objections to the ratification 
process, much historical evidence suggests that the Founding was a period of interest 
group politics and that the Founders were partly driven by their desire to secure private 
property, political power, and social status. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN 
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 
1935); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 
(1969). For a discussion of the myths surrounding the Founding, see Michael J. Klarman, 
The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544 (2011). 
 18. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 639.  
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aversion precommitment mechanisms in the form of a written 
constitution.19 
B. REJECTING TIME-BASED ARGUMENTS 
Arguments for constitutional obligation sometimes rest on 
the respect we owe the past. For example, one argument for 
constitutional obligation is grounded in the supermajorities that 
ratified it.20 But, as Seidman argues, in order for supermajorities 
to get support from other constituencies they often have to water 
down their principles. This may result either in constitutions that 
entrench minority interests or, more commonly, in constitutional 
provisions that are so vague that everyone can agree on them 
(pp. 50–51). Both situations are problematic for a position that 
embraces constitutional obedience. Under the first scenario, it is 
not clear why we would be obligated to obey a document that 
entrenches minoritarian interests. Under the second scenario, if 
everyone can find support for their preferred position, the 
Constitution is not doing any work that is independent from 
antecedent preferences. 
A different time-based argument suggests that 
constitutional obligation can be derived from what is referred to 
as “constitutional moments,” for example those that characterize 
periods such as the Founding, Reconstruction, or the New Deal 
settlement. As Bruce Ackerman argues, during constitutional 
moments the people speak and reveal their true preferences. 
These are the times when the people are engaged in 
constitutional creation, expressing their permanent convictions 
while suspending self-interest. Respecting the decisions that 
emanate from those moments is thus truly adhering to the “real” 
popular will.21 Accepting this argument also dissolves the tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy, for the Constitution 
merely reflects the settlements arrived at during constitutional 
moments, and, again, those were moments of popular political 
engagement, so enforcing the Constitution is simply enforcing 
the people’s will. 
 19. It is a misnomer to suggest that commonwealth countries do not have a 
constitution. These countries have organic acts and conventions that function like a 
constitution. When Seidman uses the term constitution, I take him to mean a written 
constitution, identified as such, that constitutes a higher law, more difficult to change, 
which legally constrains ordinary politics.  
 20. Of course, the ratification process excluded most groups, such as women, 
blacks, and non-propertied whites. This in itself significantly weakens the Constitution’s 
democratic provenance. 
 21. ACKERMAN, supra note 6.   
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Ackerman’s theory has been criticized extensively,22 but for 
Seidman’s purposes it suffices that many provisions in the 
Constitution were not the result of constitutional moments. 
More importantly, constitutional moments are never pure self- 
reflective moments where politics and rent-seeking are 
suspended.23 Idealizing these moments is therefore mistaken. 
Similar to his argument against precommitment, if the decisions 
generated by constitutional moments do not seem wise to us 
today on all things considered judgments, it is hard to 
understand the pull that a constitutional moment purports to 
exert (p. 57). 
Finally, Seidman dismantles the argument that the 
Framers are us. Psychologically it might make sense to give an 
account that connects us to the Founding or to later periods of 
constitutional creation, because we need to justify what makes 
us a unique political community.24 But even if this story makes 
sense as a metaphysical abstraction, even if we somehow see 
the United States as one ongoing entity, it does not follow that 
what happens in the past binds us today. Of course, we can 
make a choice to honor our past commitments, but that is a 
choice, not a necessity (p. 58). 
 C. ARGUMENTS FROM STABILITY 
 Arguments in favor of an obligation to obey the 
Constitution may be grounded in the Constitution’s capacity to 
settle disputes. Without an authoritative document that 
coordinates political activity we run the risk of anarchy.25 
Underlying this argument is necessarily the assumption that 
constitutionalism imposes order, for if we have a constitution, 
and yet constitutional violations occur on a routine basis, it 
would be hard to make the argument that the Constitution 
imposes settlement. At bottom this is an empirical debate, but in 
 22. See, e.g., Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467 (1994); Michael 
J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s 
Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The 
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992). 
 23. Klarman, supra note 22, at 781–85 (demonstrating that the Founding was rife 
with self-interested behavior). 
 24. For such an account see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) (arguing that self-government is 
meaningful only if it adheres to our enduring political commitments arrived over time). 
 25. Larry Alexander & Fredrick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Larry Alexander & Fredrick Schauer, 
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000).  
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order to evaluate the validity of such claims we need to have 
criteria for assessing constitutional compliance and non-
compliance. Here is where things get tricky, Seidman argues, 
because we do not, in fact, have a clear idea of what counts as a 
constitutional violation. 
Given the methodological disagreement over 
constitutional interpretation, someone who ascribes to a 
particular approach will always accuse the other of violating 
the Constitution. If we think that there is a right answer in 
principle, then someone, for example a judge, is often 
violating the Constitution according to judges who do not 
agree with his methodology. Even when there is 
methodological agreement, there will be disagreements over 
application. The fact of interpretive disagreement, then, is 
evidence that someone is almost always violating the 
Constitution according to another approach and yet the 
Constitution endures. We live with purported constitutional 
violations on a daily basis in central areas of our life, because 
someone, some of the time, is accused of violating the 
Constitution, deliberately or not (p. 64).26 The point, however, 
is that despite constitutional violations the overarching 
political framework remains intact. 
Finally, Seidman disputes (as many others have) the oft-
made claim that constitutionalism better protects freedom. 
Drawing on Madison’s image of a constitution as a “parchment 
barrier,”27 he argues that freedom is protected only in the 
presence of a political culture committed to liberty, one that 
values disagreement over obedience. Constitutions may have 
freedom protecting provisions, but their ability to deliver is an 
empirical matter, because the extent of protection depends on 
the particular content of the particular constitution and the way 
in which it is interpreted and implemented (p. 97).28 Moreover, 
having a system of judicial review does not necessarily improve 
rights protection. Courts may wrongly invalidate or uphold 
statutes, thus weakening rights, and systems of judicial review 
affect the ways in which other political institutions and society 
address rights issues, sometimes strengthening the overall level 
 26. For intentional violations, see Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and 
How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601 (2013). 
 27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 28. For an empirical examination of the gap between constitutional text and 
practice, see David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
863 (2013).  
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of rights protection, while at other times weakening it.29 
Underlying the empirical difficulty of measurement is the 
conceptually prior question of what counts as “freedom 
enhancing.” Freedom is an essentially contested concept, and 
one would be hard pressed to show why a particular conception 
adopted by a court would obligate a person who holds a 
different conception.30 Conversely, if one agrees that a court’s 
interpretation promotes freedom, one is not following the court, 
but his own conviction that he happens to share with the court. It 
is the antecedent commitment to freedom that gives rise to the 
obligation, not its constitutional inclusion (p. 101). 
D. POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO ORDINARY LAWS 
In one sense, there is nothing novel about Seidman’s thesis. 
Whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law is a 
question that has generated a voluminous literature.31 If there is 
no moral obligation to obey the law as such,32 it follows there is 
no moral obligation to obey the Constitution, for it is just a 
particular legal instrument. Seidman indeed concedes the point, 
but maintains that one can forgo constitutional obligation 
without giving up on legal obligation to statutes (p. 118). 
Seidman’s path is similar to the one taken by Joseph Raz.33 
Although there may not be a moral obligation to obey the law, 
there are reasons to obey. Laws serve important coordinative 
functions, most of them are not unjust, and there are often 
strong prudential reasons to comply (p. 119). Seidman’s con-
tribution is by distinguishing obedience to statutes from 
 29. For the development of both these claims see Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review 
and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002).  
 30. For the claim that rights are subject to reasonable disagreements, see Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). To 
demonstrate the claim, think of free speech. On one view, permitting hate speech is in 
line with the constitutional free speech guarantee. Yet others believe that hate speech 
works to silence the freedom of the groups it is directed against and should therefore be 
denied constitutional protection. 
 31. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES 
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL 
PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); J.L. Mackie, Obligations to Obey the 
Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 143 (1981); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to 
Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973). 
 32. With important exceptions, this seems to be the consensus in the literature. For 
exceptions see H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955); 
John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 
(Sidney Hook ed., 1964). Rawls’ and Hart’s position has been thoroughly undermined. 
See Smith, supra note 31, at 955–60.  
 33. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (2d ed. 2009).   
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obedience to the Constitution. The reasons that exist for 
obedience to statutes do not, he claims, apply to the 
Constitution. His argument boils down to this: there are good 
reasons to obey the law, because in exchange for compliance we 
receive benefits from living in an organized society with a legal 
system. But it is not clear, he thinks, that we receive any benefits 
from having a constitution. Countries with a constitution or a 
system of judicial review are not necessarily better at protecting 
individual rights. Similarly, even if obedience to law is desirable 
because it preserves the state, it does not follow that the state 
will go to pieces without a constitution. His argument that the 
United States Constitution is routinely violated makes that 
point. His conclusion, then, is that while no state can function 
without laws and a legal system, states can and do function 
without a constitution (p. 122). 
E. WHAT ARE THE STAKES? 
Why should we relinquish the notion that we are obligated 
to obey the Constitution? Obviously, it is strange to continue 
believing such an obligation exists if it cannot be defended. But 
Seidman is driving at something deeper, because he believes 
fidelity to the Constitution has a destructive impact on political 
discourse (p. 120). We can debate policy when we talk for or 
against statutes, but once we bring in the Constitution, the 
conversation moves to constitutional argument, methods of 
constitutional interpretation, and legal doctrine. This limits our 
political discourse, because the Constitution adds an unnecessary 
layer of language that cloaks the real issues in a way that is not 
helpful to resolve the particular question. For example, if we are 
considering adopting universal healthcare, we should examine 
how such a system might function, engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis, and consider arguments about distributive justice. But 
instead of doing that, we end up discussing whether Congress 
has power under the Commerce Clause to enact such a scheme 
or whether mandating that people buy health insurance counts 
as regulating interstate economic activity or can be considered a 
tax under Congress’s spending power.34 These questions, 
however, have very little to do with whether having universal 
healthcare is a good idea. 
The problem, Seidman argues, goes beyond constitutional 
language. Constitutional foundationalism, the idea that the 
 34. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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Constitution definitively resolves political debates, shuts down 
arguments. “When arguments are put in constitutional terms, 
they become absolutist and exclusionary” (p. 141), all the while 
excusing constitutionalists from “the obligation to give reasons 
for their constitutionalism” (p. 136). If the Constitution is 
treated as a source of binding political obligation, it becomes an 
axiom rather than a contestable principle among many. 
What, then, should we do instead? Seidman’s argument is 
that we should embrace the “thin constitution,” the idea that the 
Constitution is a site for contestation. The Constitution should 
serve as a document enumerating certain general principles, but 
those should be understood abstractly, not legally. Presumably, 
courts will also stay out of constitutional interpretation and the 
Constitution should revert to, for example, the status of the 
Declaration of Independence. Although Seidman refrains from 
saying so explicitly, his frequent invocation of Britain, New 
Zealand, Australia (which has a Constitution but no bill of 
rights), and even Israel, as role models for genuine political 
discourse, indicate that his preferred model of government is a 
parliamentary system, or at the very least a system that rejects 
constitutionalism, because it is constitutionalism that stands in 
the way of policy-based arguments and all things considered 
political decisions. 
III. IS CONSTITUTIONALISM THE PROBLEM? 
Seidman advances two major claims. The first is that there is 
no political obligation to obey the Constitution. The second is 
that constitutional obedience results in harms to our political 
discourse in a way that prevents us from addressing issues based 
on all things considered judgments. 
I believe that Seidman’s first argument is sound, though I do 
not believe it is particularly novel, even if his treatment probes 
deeper than most.35 If a constitution is understood as a legal 
instrument, the obligation to obey it is no different from that of 
any other law. The fact that it was enacted by supermajorities, 
that it may have salutary benefits, or that it somehow connects 
us with our forebears, cannot give rise to a moral obligation to 
obey. As was suggested earlier, there appears to be a near 
 35. For iterations expressing similar concerns about constitutional obligation, see John 
Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley, Editors’ Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 1, 26 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001). For a 
comprehensive treatment arriving at a similar conclusion see GREENE, supra note 31.   
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consensus that there is no prima facie moral obligation to obey 
the law as such.36 To be sure, some laws do contain moral 
obligations, but those exist independently from their legal 
entrenchment. Killing is wrong regardless of whether there is a 
legal prohibition, and the prohibition adds nothing to the moral 
duty not to kill. Similarly, a constitution can contain provisions 
that generate a moral obligation to obey, but the obligation 
arises because of the content of the norm, not its inclusion in a 
written text. Of course, there may be good reasons to obey a 
constitution, but at bottom this is an empirical question that 
depends on the particular constitutional provision, and the likely 
consequences of disobedience.37 
Seidman’s second claim, however, is much more 
complicated to substantiate. The argument that constitutional 
discourse is exclusionary, absolutist, and prevents a genuine 
merit-based debate is an assertion made throughout the book, 
without being comprehensively defended. The rest of this essay, 
therefore, will try to unpack the argument that constitutional law 
is destructive for political debate and for a robust democracy, 
and prevents all things considered decisionmaking. My 
conclusion is that Seidman casually inserts empirical 
assumptions about the workings of non-constitutionalist regimes 
that are not necessarily borne out by data. Because his is an 
empirical argument, much of it rests on contingent 
circumstances, but those play out differently in different 
contexts. Sometimes a constitution might have the pernicious 
effects Seidman warns us against, but other times a constitution 
might achieve the opposite result. Future research should 
therefore focus on identifying the conditions that make 
constitutionalism more or less conducive to political 
decisionmaking. My argument will proceed in three parts. 
Firstly, I will briefly discuss the constitutionalism impulse around 
the globe as a possible foil for Seidman’s argument that we 
should ignore the Constitution. Secondly, I will consider whether 
non-constitutionalist regimes do, in fact, facilitate all things 
considered political decisions. Finally, I will examine whether 
constitutions always negatively impact political discourse. 
 36. This consensus applies only to the question whether individuals have an 
obligation to obey the law. A separate question is whether public officials, judges 
included, have such a moral obligation. See JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF 
LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING (2010); STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO 
SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009). 
 37. See Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2012).  
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A. IF NON-CONSTITUTIONALIST REGIMES ARE SO GREAT,  
WHY ARE COUNTRIES GETTING RID OF THEM? 
Seidman rejects the idea of constitutional constraints on 
ordinary politics, arguing that by ignoring the Constitution we 
will arrive at better informed, all things considered, policy 
decisions. In making this argument, Seidman frequently 
references parliamentary regimes that do not have a written 
constitution that imposes legal constraints on politics. But 
Seidman gives short shrift to the constitutionalist trend that has 
been taking place outside the United States. Indeed, he 
overlooks the fact that more and more countries have been 
discarding their pure parliamentary and non-constitutionalist 
regimes in favor of constitutions and judicial review.38 As Alec 
Stone Sweet and Cristina Andersen show in a study from 2008, 
190 countries have written constitutions, of which 183 have a bill 
of rights. Importantly, of the 114 constitutions written since 1985 
(not all of them still in use), at least 106 of them contain a bill of 
rights and 101 provide for judicial review of legislation. The only 
country to leave out a bill of rights was the 1983 apartheid-era 
South African Constitution, hardly a ringing endorsement.39 
Most famously, classical Westminster parliamentary 
systems, such as Canada, Britain, New Zealand, and Israel, have 
incorporated constitutional elements into their political 
institutions. Canada passed a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
1982, which also significantly expanded judicial review of 
legislation. Britain passed the Human Rights Act in 1998, giving 
effect to rights contained in the European Convention of Human 
Rights, while also enabling “weak form” judicial review of laws 
that are incompatible with those rights. New Zealand, though 
maintaining its parliamentary system, has passed a bill of rights 
law that instructs courts to interpret legislation consistently with 
the rights enumerated there. And Israel transformed itself from 
a pure parliamentary system to a country with a set of basic laws 
that are superior to ordinary legislation, which can now be struck 
down through judicial review.40 
This trend is important because it attests to a dissatisfaction 
with parliamentary and non-constitutionalist regimes. At the very 
 38. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
771 (1997). 
 39. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 84 n.27 (2008). 
 40. For elaboration, see STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).  
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least it should give Seidman pause and lead him to ask what is 
going on. If constitutions obstruct political discourse and 
democratic decisionmaking, why are so many countries opting to 
transition to such systems? To be sure, many scholars have offered 
explanations, ranging from a commitment to human rights, 
signaling to other developed countries that they belong in the same 
camp, or to attempts by embattled hegemonies to preserve political 
power that they believe will be lost.41 Some of these explanations 
could fit with Seidman’s argument against constitutionalism, but 
the book does not explore this question at all. Thus we remain with 
an assertion about the evils of constitutionalism without examining 
why alternative regimes, including those favored by Seidman, are in 
the process of being phased out all over the world. Of course, all 
these countries could be wrong. But Seidman should at least 
explain why they are wrong, and why his proposed solution 
(ignoring the Constitution) would function better in the U.S. than 
in the countries that have tried and experimented with non-
constitutionalist frameworks. 
This brings up a related point. Throughout the book, Seidman 
treats constitutionalism as a monolithic entity. The main idea is that 
we have to get rid of the “legal” (as opposed to the “poetic”) 
Constitution, or, when the Constitution does not suit our policy 
judgments, simply ignore it. But it is not clear why the choice is 
presented so starkly, as a dichotomy. Not only have other countries 
adopted forms of constitutionalism that are different than the 
American version, but various forms of constitutionalism exist 
inside the United States.42 Part of the problem with the federal 
Constitution no doubt lies with the hurdles imposed by Article V. 
The difficulty of amending the Constitution preserves dysfunctional 
governance structures and, as a result, shifts the focus to 
constitutional interpretation and the courts. But would relaxing the 
amendment procedure respond to Seidman’s concerns? 
Constitutions that are easy to amend might facilitate better 
decisionmaking because they are less likely to create the absolutist 
discourse Seidman warns against, but they may also generate 
frequent political crises that make governance difficult.43 
 41. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Rights as 
Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002). 
 42. See, e.g., JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 
(2006); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS 
OF GOVERNANCE (2012). 
 43. In the United States alone, there have been nearly 150 state constitutions that 
have been amended roughly 12,000 times, with several constitutions being amended  
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Thus, the real question should not be whether to 
embrace the Constitution or to ignore it, but rather whether 
this particular constitution, with the particular institutional 
structures it establishes, serves us well. Are there better 
constitutional arrangements that we might consider, or are 
all constitutional arrangements, by their nature, so harmful 
that only a non-constitutionalist system can generate good 
decisionmaking that meets Seidman’s standards? To be clear, 
my point is not that amending Article V (or any other 
structural change) will put Seidman’s concerns to rest, nor is 
it that a different institutional configuration will then give 
rise to an obligation to obey, as opposed to providing a good 
reason. Seidman may be right in the end, but his conclusion 
should be the result of careful consideration of institutional 
alternatives, not an unsubstantiated assertion. In the sections 
that follow, I begin to explore some of these considerations. 
B. DO NON-CONSTITUTIONALIST REGIMES FACILITATE ALL 
THINGS CONSIDERED POLITICAL DECISIONS? 
In his discussion of alternative political arrangements, 
Seidman often invokes parliamentary systems that operate 
without a written constitution (or without a constitutional 
bill of rights) as examples for countries where political 
decisions are not encumbered by constitutional constraints 
that in turn drive out merit-based decisions. If we did not 
have a constitution, we could address the issues themselves 
without being distracted and without each side claiming 
monopoly on their position by invoking the Constitution. 
While this claim may seem non-falsifiable, I believe that 
there are ways to approach this question. In this section I 
propose we examine the quality of political debates in 
parliamentary systems and some of the structural problems 
such systems might generate. A different strategy, one which 
will be taken in the next section, tries to gauge the quality of 
political debate in the U.S. in areas where the Constitution is 
relatively silent. 
There have been very few attempts to measure discourse 
quality in politics,44 and those have been limited to very small 
hundreds of times. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2 
(2000); THE NBER/MARYLAND ST. CONST. PROJECT, http://www.stateconstitutions. 
umd.edu/index.aspx.  
 44. Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse 
Quality Index, 1 COMP. EUR. POL. 21 (2003).  
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case studies that are difficult to generalize.45 What counts as 
quality is controversial,46 and there is no consensus that 
deliberative quality and just outcomes are related. One insight 
revealed by studies that examine parliamentary debates is that 
although discourse quality may make some difference in political 
institutions, power politics dominate most contexts. In 
representative democracies, the mechanisms to select repre-
sentatives determine, indirectly, which issues will be raised and 
how. Improving discursive quality and mitigating instances of 
power politics is thus partly a matter of institutional design, for 
example, through constitutional devices.47 
Other studies have sought to compare deliberative quality 
among different types of legislatures.48 One study concludes that 
presidentialist systems are likely to outperform parliamentary 
systems. In the former, the executive is not dependent on 
legislative confidence, creating a situation of mutual 
independence where legislators have more leeway to act without 
undermining governmental stability, whereas in parliamentary 
systems government controls parliament and thus needs strong 
party discipline.49 In presidentialist systems legislators might 
have more ability to transcend party boundaries and be open to 
discursive change.50 On the other hand, the need for reelection 
 45. See, e.g., André Bächtiger et al., Patterns of Parliamentary Discourse: How 
‘Deliberative’ are German Legislatives Debates?, 17 GERMAN POL. 270 (2008); Peter 
Nugus, Rhetorical Strategies of Political Parties and Organized Movements: Deliberative 
Democracy and the Australian Monarchy—Republican Debate, 45 J. SOC. 307 (2009). 
 46. Most of the studies I examine use the “deliberative quality index” modeled 
after Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics. See Steenbergen, supra note 44. The criteria 
are: 1) participation, 2) level of justification, the reasons speakers give and the 
sophistication, 3) content of the justification (phrased as the common good or narrow 
interests), 4) respect toward the group, 5) respect toward demand, 6) respect toward 
counterarguments, and 7) is the political process constructive, do speakers submit 
alternative proposals or seek mediation. See André Bächtiger & Marco R. Steenbergen, 
The Real World of Deliberation: A Comparative Study of Its Favorable Conditions in 
Legislatures, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/17, at 12, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/2634/sps2004-17.pdf.  
 47. Markus Spörndli, Discourse Quality and Political Decisions: An Empirical 
Analysis of Debates in the German Conference Committee (Univ. of Bern, Discussion 
Paper No. SP IV 2003-101, 2003), available at http://www.bids.unibe.ch/unibe/ 
rechtswissenschaft/oefre/bids/content/e3446/e3501/iv03-101.pdf.  
 48. The subsequent discussion assumes that political decisions are affected by 
institutional design and that the distinction between parliamentary and presidential 
systems matters. This does not mean that parliamentary systems cannot sometimes 
operate like presidential systems and vice versa. My discussion presents both systems as 
ideal types. See Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 
AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2009). 
 49. Bächtiger& Steenbergen, supra note 46, at 8. 
 50. Id.  
 
3 - THE END OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW_SHINAR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2014 11:56 AM 
2014] BOOK REVIEWS 199 
may undercut this deliberative freedom, bringing it closer to that 
of parliamentary systems, since representatives are dependent 
on party support for future campaigns. Of course, the quality of 
deliberation also depends on the particular issue. Polarizing 
issues, the ones Seidman may be referring to, are likely to 
generate deliberation of lesser quality, whereas low polarization 
issues are likely to facilitate better deliberation.51 An empirical 
examination taking these considerations into account, comparing 
the U.S. presidentialist system to the United Kingdom’s and 
Germany’s parliamentary system revealed, for example, that 
legislators in the U.S. display more respect toward the 
opposition, though parliaments offer more sophisticated 
justifications for their policies.52 The usage of constitutional 
language, however, was not clear. The little data we have 
suggests that Seidman’s empirical argument is difficult to 
evaluate. 
Parliamentary systems also differ from other political 
systems in the way government exercises power. In 
parliamentary systems one party (or a coalition of parties) 
controls both the legislature and the executive. The executive 
controls the legislative process, and in fact has a de facto 
monopoly over the introduction of legislation. This may make 
parliamentary systems more efficient,53 but the upshot is that the 
majority has an easier time ignoring the opposition and will 
consequently be less likely to search for common solutions or 
genuine consensus. Respect and persuasion will likely also be 
lower compared with a system with more veto points.54 Higher 
levels of discourse are more likely to occur when the government 
needs at least some support from the opposition. It is to be 
expected, then, that in these situations there will be less appeal 
to “absolutist, exclusionary” language. Indeed, why would all 
things considered decisions be made if one’s majority is already 
guaranteed? True, inclusive political discussion can take place in 
other venues, for example in the press, the street and in 
academia, but then can we really say that such discourse does 
 51. Id. at 9. 
 52. Id. at 17. The research looked at debates in the 1980s and 1990s. It is possible 
the political culture was less toxic then, which strengthens my argument that the 
constitutional design plays a limited role. 
 53. But see Albert, supra note 48, at 564–73 (discussing unstable minority and 
coalition governments). 
 54. On the importance of veto players in political systems see George Tsebelis, 
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, 
Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995).  
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not take place, and at just as high a level, in countries that have a 
constitution? 
Non-constitutionalist parliamentary systems introduce other 
problems that are less likely to occur in systems of divided 
political power with constitutional judicial review. In multiparty 
parliamentary systems, the largest party will often not have 
exclusive control of parliament. It will need to build coalitions 
with other parties. In exchange for joining what will usually be 
the largest party, the smaller parties will exact a price. This may 
lead to situations where certain issues are not debated at all 
because they are off the table. Crucially, having an enforceable 
constitution may alleviate some of the blockages in political 
discourse. 
To illustrate, consider two examples from Israel, a country 
with a parliamentary system that until relatively recently was not 
considered to have a constitution.55 The first example is military 
service for ultraorthodox Jews. Israel has mandatory 
conscription for its Jewish population, but since its founding 
ultraorthodox Jews have been exempt. Initially the number of 
exemptions was small, but over time it grew to levels that were 
believed to be unsustainable, but more importantly, unfair, by 
the majority population that did serve. The problem was that 
ultraorthodox parties figured into almost all government 
coalitions. As a condition for their support, they insisted on 
maintaining the status quo. No matter how much the Israeli 
public was disgruntled, the political channels were blocked. 
Consequently, individuals turned to litigation to try and force 
the government to address the matter. After several failed 
attempts, petitioners constitutionalized their claims, grounding 
them both in structural arguments and equality based 
arguments.56 Those were more successful, and in several cases 
the Supreme Court struck down the arrangements obtaining to 
exemption of ultraorthodox Jews. Since then, the issue has 
become one of the most important and discussed issues in Israeli 
politics, with the government currently trying to enact a new 
plan for recruitment. It is unclear whether such a plan will 
 55. For a discussion of Israel’s constitutional revolution, see Gidon Sapir, The 
Israeli Constitutional Revolution—How did it Happen?, (Bar-Ilan University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1082230. 
 56. HCJ 910/86 Resler v. Minister of Defence, 42(2) PD 441 [1988] (Isr.); HCJ 
3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence, 52(5) PD 481 [1998] (Isr.); HCJ 6298/07 
Resler v. Minister of Defence [2012] (Isr.) (unpublished).  
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emerge and whether it would be struck down as well. Should 
that happen, Seidman will be right to argue that a constitution 
can become a roadblock to further deliberation, but the point is 
that without constitutional review the issue would have likely 
remained blocked by the regular political channels because of 
Israel’s parliamentary structure. Going to the Supreme Court, 
raising the stakes, and constitutionalizing the claims, forced the 
political branches to debate the issue and make decisions that 
otherwise would likely not have been made. Though it is too 
early to tell, this may be a case of constitutionalism improving, 
not degrading, political decisionmaking. 
The second example is the political status of Palestinian 
citizens of Israel. Palestinian citizens can vote and be elected to 
Israel’s parliament, and most of them run in what are called 
“Arab parties.” Those parties do gain seats, but no Arab party 
has ever been a member of any Israeli governmental coalition. 
Thus the problem is that for the most part, Palestinian citizens 
have very little say in the laws governing them. 
A partial remedy to the lack of representation and 
discrimination has been constitutional judicial review of laws and 
policies that discriminate against Palestinian citizens.57 Recall 
that Seidman argues that constitutionalism unnecessarily raises 
the stakes of the debate and leads to absolutist language that 
excludes viewpoints and prevents merit-based policy judgments. 
But what if the political system is designed in such a way, or the 
political culture operates in such a way, that particular 
viewpoints and persons never get to enter the debate in the first 
place? If one thinks that ordinary political channels are captured 
by lobbies, or if particular groups do not have a say in the 
democratic process, then non-constitutionalist parliamentary 
regimes might exacerbate such tendencies. Of course, Seidman 
may reply that in such cases not having a constitution makes 
things easier because we can more easily change a non-
functioning system. But what would be the majority’s incentive 
to change a system that essentially works in its favor? 
Constitutionalism, then, has the potential to open up multiple 
avenues of discourse (legal and political), which in turn can 
expand the parameters of politics, broadly understood. 
 57. The issue of Palestinians under occupation is more complicated, and the 
Supreme Court’s record is much more controversial in that arena. For a critical overview, 
see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002).  
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My point is that the division of political power, a central 
feature of most constitutionalist regimes, can work as a bulwark 
against the political corruption generated by the concentration 
of power in parliamentary systems. Perhaps Seidman would 
respond that such problems do not arise in the United States, but 
then the question would be, is he right? And if so, did 
constitutionalism play an historical role in his being right? 
I do not want to press this point too much. Seidman is not 
exactly suggesting that we transition to a Westminster style 
system.58 What he really means to say is that we should operate 
without formally written constitutional constraints, similar to the 
workings of Westminster type systems. But there are two 
problems with such a claim. First, Westminster systems do 
operate with a set of constraints, written laws and unwritten 
constitutional conventions that effectively operate like a 
constitution in that changing these deeply embedded norms is 
extremely difficult.59 Second, non-constitutionalist systems have 
their own problems that affect how political debate is conducted, 
with the result that some decisions will not be made after an all 
things considered process. Idealizing such systems is therefore a 
mistake. 
C. DO CONSTITUTIONS ALWAYS NEGATIVELY IMPACT 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND DECISIONMAKING? 
Understandably, Seidman does not spend too much time on 
comparative institutional analysis. His claim is philosophical, but 
mostly it is grounded in American constitutional experience, 
albeit only the federal constitutional experience. It would 
therefore be valuable to examine policy debates in areas in 
which the federal Constitution is silent or not litigated. If 
constitutionalism has a pervasively corrosive effect on political 
decisionmaking, we might expect that in non-constitutional 
domains political discourse will be of higher quality and not be 
infected by constitutional pathologies. 
To evaluate the corrosiveness of constitutional discourse, 
we must first consider the scope of Seidman’s claim. Suppose, for 
 58. For an evaluation of such a suggestion, see Richard L. Hasen, Political 
Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 86 DRAKE L. REV. 989 (2013) (arguing that 
tinkering with the constitutional design is risky and suggesting that the current crisis 
might self-correct as voters reject party positions that stray too far from the median 
voter). 
 59. See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959).  
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example, that the Constitution affects only a small percentage of 
political activity and public policy. In that case, although 
Seidman’s concerns would be valid, they would not trouble us all 
that much. Seidman’s argument becomes more important as the 
scope of political activity that arises under the Constitution 
grows. To be sure, all political activity arises under the 
Constitution, because it takes place under institutional structures 
the Constitution sets up.60 Seidman, however, focuses on 
constitutional language rather than institutional structures.61 It is 
thus important to distinguish his argument from the arguments 
that abound about how the constitutional design contributes to 
the dysfunctional political system.62 Although it is true that 
institutional design affects the way politicians make claims,63 that 
linkage is not made explicit in the book. 
How much political activity is actually affected by 
Seidman’s argument? Here too the answer is elusive, but my 
sense is that constitutional scholars, unsurprisingly, exaggerate 
the importance of the Constitution and constitutional law. Let us 
assume that Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters 
dovetail with the types of concerns made by Seidman. But as 
Frederick Schauer, drawing on extensive polling data, showed in 
2006, many issues that engage the public and government never 
make it to courts, and when they are publicly discussed the 
Constitution is usually not invoked.64 Standard debates about the 
economy, social security, pensions, foreign affairs, the federal 
budget, education, poverty, taxes, the environment, healthcare, 
welfare, fuel prices, wars, employment, energy, and defense 
spending, just to name a few, are rarely phrased and argued in 
constitutional terms.65 True, the Constitution does play a role in 
some of these debates, but usually an indirect one, and it is not 
clear whether that role leads to the results Seidman warns 
 60. MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2010). 
 61. Though of course his claim about constitutional obedience applies to 
institutional structures as well. 
 62. LEVINSON, supra note 9; THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S 
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); Symposium, The U.S. 
Constitution and Political Dysfunction: Is There a Connection?, 86 DRAKE L. REV. 937 
(2013). 
 63. See generally GARY MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK, DELIBERATIVE CHOICES: 
DEBATING PUBLIC POLICY IN CONGRESS (2006). 
 64. Frederick Schauer, Forward: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (2006). 
 65. Healthcare is a very recent exception, and even then the discussion was about 
two (central) provisions of an entire bill. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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against.66 Of course, even if the Court does decide to take up a 
hotly contested issue, that in itself does not necessarily lead to 
the denigration of political discourse. Courts often decide 
constitutional cases only to conclude that the political branches 
are owed broad deference and remand the matter to be argued 
elsewhere, often in non-constitutional language. 
Seidman, I anticipate, would probably say this is beside 
the point. The Court does decide some issues, some of them 
are extremely important, and there is no reason for these 
issues to be beyond the reach of ordinary politics. We are thus 
left, again, with a question of comparative analysis: Is the 
political decisionmaking process in areas that are not 
dominated by constitutional considerations better than in the 
areas where constitutional discourse is regularly invoked by 
all sides? 
Much like the claim about parliamentary regimes that do 
not have a written constitution that constrains ordinary 
lawmaking, I believe that any answer is contingent and context 
dependent. I leave it to the reader to decide the quality of 
American political decisionmaking in areas not dominated by 
constitutional considerations. Several points, however, are worth 
mentioning. For starters, there is relatively little research about 
actual political deliberation. Most theorists have ideas about 
what deliberation should look like, whereas empirically oriented 
research tends to focus on deliberation’s effects.67 Secondly, 
those who have studied deliberation in political settings are not 
as sanguine as Seidman about the possibility of merit-based all 
things considered decisions, with or without the Constitution. 
Obstacles to optimal deliberation include, among others, 
unequal deliberative capacities, varying motivations among 
participants, and information asymmetries. Even if these 
problems are overcome, the deliberative process takes place in 
institutional structures that are populated by elected officials, 
bureaucrats, and interest groups, all of whom have personal, 
ideological, economic, and institutional preferences that are not 
necessarily aligned with the substantive merits of the issue in 
question.68 
 66. Schauer, supra note 64, at 49 (arguing that the Court is only indirectly involved 
in the nation’s policy decisions). 
 67. See David M. Ryfe, Does Deliberative Democracy Work?, 8 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 49, 54 (2005). The literature on public choice makes a similar point. 
 68. For a detailed discussion of congressional deliberation and its pitfalls, see 
MUCCIARONI & QUIRK, supra note 63.   
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Consider the political activity that takes place in Congress. 
Seidman argues that constitutional language is a conversation 
stopper because constitutional claims stem from first principles 
that are usually not open to reasoned debate. Yet the use of non-
falsifiable language is not confined to constitutional talk. For 
example, research that examined 72 congressional committee 
hearings on Medicare, an area when the Constitution is not 
usually invoked, concluded that participants offer falsifiable 
rationales when the issue is only moderately contentious. The 
more contentious the issue becomes, the more participants shift 
to non-falsifiable rationales. When the debate shifts to 
irreconcilable value conflicts, “participants may expect others to 
filter out information that is inconsistent with their priors. . . 
With strong disagreement over values and ideological beliefs, 
debate participants often cannot hope to modify their 
opponents’ views of the policy choice.”69 Similar results have 
been found elsewhere.70 
This suggests that the problem is disagreement, not 
constitutional language. The use of non-falsifiable language 
is but a symptom of a larger problem. Eliminating the 
Constitution does not get rid of disagreement. Speakers will 
simply revert to other non-falsifiable or contentious 
rationales (morals, religion, ideology) that are just as likely 
to be exclusivist or absolutist as constitutional discourse. 
When it comes to the most contentious issues, what gets in 
the way of resolution is not simply the language that we use, 
but the fact that these issues are really divisive and subject to 
reasonable disagreements. Of course we can eliminate 
constitutional language, but these disagreements will then be 
mediated by different terms which are likely to be just as 
unbridgeable. 
In addition to the use of absolutist language, there is the 
phenomenon of “one party lawmaking.” For example, 
legislators have ways to avoid debating issues altogether by 
bypassing committee deliberations so as to limit the influence 
of their partisan rivals. Committee chairs have occasionally 
shut down hearings to stop minority-invited witnesses from 
testifying and prevented minority party members from reading 
 69. Kevin M. Esterling, “Deliberative Disagreement” in U.S. Health Policy 
Committee Hearings, 36 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 169, 171 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 70. MUCCIARONI & QUIRK, supra note 63, at 14 (finding that welfare reform 
debates in Congress became less informative as “election time drew near” and “as the 
level of partisanship rose”).  
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legislation.71 Majority leaders have at times excluded committees 
from the legislative process, giving the job to ad hoc task forces 
instead.72 Both parties, when in the majority, have placed 
restrictive rules on many bills to prevent floor amendments from 
being made and debated.73 As William Bendix concludes, one 
party lawmaking is attributable to increasing partisan 
polarization and electoral competition. One party control of 
legislation is more pronounced when the majority feels 
threatened or when the majority’s policy goals face significant 
opposition. Unsurprisingly, restriction of debate occurs more in 
bills that reflect the majority party’s “brand,” for example in 
taxation and morals legislation. In these areas the majority party 
has fixed preferences, and therefore has “little incentive to 
collect new policy information and to explore counter proposals. 
If the majority deviates from its long-held policy positions, it 
risks harming its brand and alienating its core supporters.”74 
The takeaway is simple. Seidman claims that 
constitutionalism is harmful for democratic discourse. But 
although this observation may be correct, it may also be of 
relatively little import. Politicians have discursive and 
institutional tools at their disposal to limit democratic debate. 
They make non-falsifiable claims in matters of high saliency and 
they can rely on internal legislative rules to bypass all things 
considered judgments. Indeed, the filibuster, one of the more 
maligned devices claimed to be responsible for the current 
political gridlock, is a consequence of Senate rules that can be 
changed with an ordinary majority. These and other debate 
limiting strategies are not grounded in the Constitution. They 
would be available even if the Constitution was ignored, and 
they can be changed independently of the Constitution. On this 
view, constitutionalism is a rhetorical strategy, among many 
others. Does it add to the politician’s toolkit? No doubt. Does it 
add to it in a way that is quantitatively and qualitatively 
significant? Of that I am less sure. 
Up until now, I have argued that the host of factors 
affecting political debate makes it difficult to assess the relative 
 71. William Claus Bendix, One Party Deliberations in the U.S. House of 
Representatives 1 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of British 
Columbia) (citing SUNIL AHUJA, CONGRESS BEHAVING BADLY: THE RISE OF 
PARTISANSHIP AND INCIVILITY AND THE DEATH OF PUBLIC TRUST 33 (2008)). 
 72. Id. at 2  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 4.  
 
3 - THE END OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW_SHINAR (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2014 11:56 AM 
2014] BOOK REVIEWS 207 
contribution of the Constitution to the denigration of that 
discourse. To be clear, I do not think Seidman is wrong to 
believe that constitutional talk has harmful consequences, only 
that the empirical case for proving this assertion is complicated 
and has not been made out as fully as it could have been. Before 
concluding, however, we should consider whether the 
Constitution also has the capacity to create better discourse and 
generate better democratic decisions. If it does, then we must 
weigh those benefits against the purported costs. 
Much like Seidman’s claim about the harm of constitutional 
language, it is difficult to gauge the discursive benefits of having 
a constitution.75 Still, it is worth considering what the 
Constitution does. A constitution can serve as a “focal point for 
an ongoing debate and dialogue, in which all members of society 
participate.”76 The emphasis here is on the words “ongoing” and 
“all members.” Just as constitutional talk can be exclusive and 
absolutist, so too can it be inclusive and relative, and mediate all 
things considered decisions. As Joseph Raz argued in the context 
of individual rights: 
Assertions of rights are typically intermediate conclusions 
in arguments from ultimate values to duties . . . . The fact 
that practical arguments proceed through the mediation of 
intermediate stages so that not every time a practical 
question arises does one refer to ultimate values for an 
answer is . . . of crucial importance in making social life 
possible, not only because it saves time and tediousness, 
but primarily because it enables a common culture to be 
formed round shared intermediate conclusions, in spite of a 
great degree of haziness and disagreement concerning 
ultimate values.77 
Indeed, in an earlier book Seidman himself made a similar claim 
when he defended judicial review on the grounds that it has the 
 75. Seidman essentially admits this. Recall that he argues that the Constitution does 
not necessarily protect freedom. Yet the use of the word “necessarily” implies that the 
case for a definitive determination is complicated. Seidman references many cases where 
the Court protected freedom only when the public supported it, but the counterargument 
to that is that such cases can later serve the Court in instances where the public is more 
ambivalent.  
 76. Barak Medina, “Foundational” Originalism? On Jack Balkin’s Living 
Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 77. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (1986), cited in Medina, supra 
note 76, at 13 n.64. For a similar point, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).  
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capacity to unsettle outcomes produced by the political process.78 
In that book, he argued that constitutional law can help build a 
community not by settling political disputes, but by creating 
them. Losers have no reason to abide by political settlements 
they deeply oppose, he wrote, “[b]ut a constitution that unsettles 
creates no permanent losers.”79 On that view, constitutional 
language is the opposite of exclusivity and absolutism. It 
provides a semantic framework that, precisely because of its 
haziness, destabilizes political conflict and keeps everyone 
engaged in the same enterprise. 
Of course, according to Seidman we can (and should) use 
constitutional language without giving it constitutional force. 
The Constitution will be available, but its power will be limited 
to that of a poem, as a symbolic expression of our commitments, 
much in the same way we use the Declaration of Independence 
as a rhetorical device. The problem is that if the Constitution 
were a poem it would not be as powerful a focal point. It would 
not be able to perform the unsettlement function and it would 
lose much of its symbolic capital.80 To be sure, this is exactly 
what Seidman is driving at, yet alongside the discursive benefits 
of such a move, there may also be discursive costs—costs that 
even Seidman used to believe existed—that should be taken into 
account. 
A constitution can be viewed pessimistically, as introducing 
brakes on popular self-government, or optimistically, as 
introducing devices that may activate and energize better 
democratic government by making officials and society more 
focused about everyone’s rights and interests.81 A constitution 
can mobilize social movements, both symbolically and 
substantively, but it may also limit social change, because of the 
narrow, and often conservative, legal frame it necessarily adopts 
 78. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW 
DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). 
 79. Id. at 8. 
 80. Ackerman, supra note 38, at 779 (discussing the symbolic capital of con-
stitutions). Historically, the legal status of the Constitution was essential for signaling to 
the rest of the world that the United States should be admitted to the community of 
civilized states, and constitution making was key to realizing that goal. See David M. 
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, 
the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 
(2010). 
 81. Works in game theory and economics, for example, seek to show how 
institutional constraints can increase the capacity of government by making it more 
credible to others, both domestically and internationally. See Ferejohn, supra note 35, at 
22–24, 25 n.19 (citing studies).  
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in order to succeed in the courts.82 Constitutional law is thus both 
transformational and limiting. Both of these strands exist in 
American constitutional history. Both have proved correct in 
different times, and it is not clear which has the better 
argument.83 In the end, Seidman is right to argue that even under 
the optimistic view of constitutionalism there is no political 
obligation to obey. But there may be good reasons why we 
would want a constitution. Those reasons will likely be 
instrumentalist and depend on the particular constitutional 
design and its likely effects in a particular society. Although 
explicating all the reasons goes beyond the scope of this review, 
they should nevertheless inform our decision whether to discard 
the Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Louis Michael Seidman has written a deep, probing, and 
fascinating book on the nature of constitutional obligation. His 
diagnosis that American constitutionalism is gravely ill is highly 
persuasive. His argument that there is no moral obligation to 
obey the Constitution is, to my mind, convincing. It does not 
follow, however, that constitutionalism as an idea must be 
discarded. To borrow a line from his former book, the fact that 
there are problems with constitutional theories does not mean 
we should get rid of constitutional theory.84 There may be good 
reasons to obey a constitution even if there is no political 
obligation to do so. One may wish to emulate, as Seidman does, 
countries that do not impose higher law constraints on ordinary 
politics, but then one should also keep in mind that such systems 
have costs of their own. No political system is perfect, nor can it 
be. The questions are what are the costs and benefits and the 
tradeoffs that are involved. Those are questions Seidman does 
not answer, though he nevertheless opens the conversation for 
such an inquiry. 
 
 82. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 877, 894 (2013). 
 83. For an optimistic account about the interaction of judicial review and civil 
society, see CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).  
 84. SEIDMAN, supra note 78, at 7.  
 
